Salvage Operations in the Arabian Sea

Having been released from duties in the Gulf of Oman at 0530 on Saturday, 13th October and having replenished from RFA Wave Knight, St Brides Bay was proceeding to Singapore. At 0915 a signal was received through Ceylon Radio from the tanker Ceres reporting a collision of two tankers, Fernand Gilabert and Melika, in position 12 miles North West of Ras Al Hadd. It stated that a doctor was urgently required and that she was proceeding towards Aden with 22 survivors. This position was incorrect and was in fact 180 miles from the true one. Fortunately at 0935 a further signal from Ceres was intercepted giving the correct position, which was only 80 miles West-South-West of St Brides Bay.

Course was altered immediately and Ceres was informed that St Brides Bay was proceeding to her assistance with a doctor on board. St Brides Bay was not required to give medical assistance, as Bulwark with her helicopters was able to supply doctors to the three ships with survivors on board, and also to take the seriously injured ashore to the RAF station at Masira.

At 1250 a stationary contact by radar suggested it might he one of the damaged ships, although it was some 50 miles from the position of the collision. This proved to be correct and it was the French tanker, Fernand Gilabert of 10,000 tons. She was a dismal sight. Her bows below the waterline were cut back about 40 feet where she had ridden over the low well decks of the fully laden 20,000 ton tanker Melika. A fire was still burning in the bridge superstructure and the remainder of the ship was blackened with smoke. Her lifeboat falls hung from the davits and a rope ladder trailed astern. A helicopter from Bulwark hovered over her forecastle landing a salvage party. This consisted of the Commander of Bulwark, two other officers, three technical ratings and a signalman.

As we circled her it could he seen that because of her high freeboard and shallow draught - she was in ballast - she was moving quite rapidly through the water. Her drift was estimated at between 2-3 knots with a forward movement of about one knot. She was lying beam on to the sea.

It was considered that the first priority was to put more men onboard to assist in fighting the fire and also to haul in the towing gear when it was passed. The helicopters were unable to help as they had to return. Weather conditions were still marginal for the use of a seaboat but, because of the fire, it was decided to make the attempt. The seaboat, with a lieutenant in charge, was slipped in the lee of the tanker and in addition to its crew, it carried one officer, five ratings, a walkie-talkie and fire-fighting equipment.

No ladder was available on the lee side of the tanker, so on clearing the ship, the seaboat made for the hanging rope ladder astern of the tanker. The full effect of the sea and swell, coupled with the forward movement of the tanker and the fact that the rudder was breaking surface close to the ladder made it difficult for the seaboat to secure to the ladder.

The boarding party, led by Sub-Lieutenant Rogers, therefore jumped into the water and swam the few yards to the ladder - a difficult and dangerous task - but all got onboard the tanker safely. The whaler then pulled to the lee of the tanker where the stores were transferred by heaving line.

On completion of this transfer, the ship was brought into the lee of the tanker to hoist the seaboat. A delay was caused as the forward fall became unhooked and entangled, and only by using 'full ahead' as soon as the boat was clear of the water did we avoid having the tanker drift down on to us and hitting our stern. It was then decided to send more gear over by line, and not to lower the seaboat with more men for the time being, owing to the difficulties of boarding and an unexplained failure of the disengaging gear.

The remaining fire-fighting gear, consisting of a portable pump, clothing and an Aldis lamp was then passed over by line. This took time as it was difficult to hold the ship in position and was not completed until 1700. The fire in the tanker was by now under control and preparations were made to take Fernand Gilabert in tow. It was decided to tow her stern first, as the badly damaged bow might not stand the strain and its distortion would make her uncontrollable when being towed ahead.

The first attempt was made by running down wind across the stern. A line was passed, but before the 3½ towing wire could be got onboard, the two ships drifted apart and the line had to be let go onboard the tanker. The second attempt was made by running in from the stern and passing close down the weather side. Once again, after the line had been passed, it was impossible to hold St Brides Bay close enough for the few men onboard the tanker to haul the wire onboard. This time the 4 inch manila parted, and 80 fathoms plus the light jackstay transfer gear attached to the outboard end was lost. The chain check stoppers burned through and a further stopper parted at the eyebolt.

Although the normal method of passing a 180 fathom grass was dispensed with to reduce heavy work onboard the tanker, it was obvious that, with the prevailing weather conditions and the few men on-hoard the tanker, the only sure method of getting the tow across was to put St Brides Bay alongside. The light was going and although we appreciated that some damage to St Brides Bay might well result, it was decided to attempt it for the following reasons:

(a) A weather forecast from Bulwark of wind force 7-8 from the South had just been received.

(b) The tanker had already drifted some 55 miles in 13 hours since the collision, and at this rate would be on the lee shore of Iran within 48 hours.

(d) It was hoped that the higher rate of drift of the tanker would keep the two ships apart sufficiently to protect serious humping.

During the final stages of coming alongside, the two ships yawed toward each other resulting in damage to St Brides Bays bows. Once the headrope had been passed the two ships lay alongside comfortably for a few moments, and three ratings jumped over. The two ships then rolled towards each other, and most of the remaining damage was done. This happened once more before the tow was passed, and the two ships drifted apart. One 6 inch manila was badly damaged and one parted while passing the tow.

With some difficulty, the ship was turned 180 degrees before taking the strain on the tow, which consisted of 150 fathoms 34 inch rope secured to a bollard on the stern of the tanker. The inboard end in St Brides Bay was secured to one shackle of the cable to which another shackle was added later.

Towing began at 1800, by which time the ships had drifted to a position 085 degrees Ras Al Hadd 36 miles, and although no repair facilities were available in that direction, it was decided to try and make for the shelter of the Gulf of Oman where a more permanent tow could be passed and where more hands could be put onboard while waiting for the weather to moderate. Revolutions were put on slowly, and at a speed of 7 knots the tow appeared to he making slow headway. However, soon after way was on, the stern of the tanker paid off to port which pulled the bows round to starboard. Only by stopping and letting the tanker drift astern could St Brides Bay be brought back on course. Attempts were made in the tanker to put the rudder over to counteract this.

At 0250 on Sunday 14th, the tow parted in the tanker's fairlead. At this time the position of the ships was 085 degrees Ras Al Hadd 35 miles. On recovering the tow later It was found that the 5½ inch wire had also parted 11 inches from where it joined the cable. This left one 2½ inch wire and a few berthing wires.

Loch Killisport had joined the previous evening and had been told to take the tanker in tow should St Brides Bays part. For the remainder of the night the tanker drifted, and at dawn the wind was still force 5 with a heavy sea, so no attempt was made then to pass another tow. At this stage it appeared that short of the arrival of an ocean going tug, or until the weather moderated, the best chance of getting the tanker to safety was to get her engines working. Reports from her indicated that this was possible if more technical ratings could be put onboard. Bulwark was asked to send a helicopter so that the necessary ratings could be sent over from the two frigates. The helicopter duly arrived at 1630 and a party of I ERA, 1 POME, 1 ME and 1 LEM with their tool-kits were transferred from St Brides Bay. While the transfer was in progress the tanker Montcerau, a sister ship of the Fernand Gilabert, arrived to inspect the damage on behalf of their company. She gallantly dipped to the white ensign flying above the bridge of her sister ship.

At 0730 on Monday, 15th September, St Brides Bay set course to join Bulwark, leaving Lock Killisport favourably placed to pass a tow as the wind had dropped. At 1045, Puma was sighted standing by Melika. Bulwark was replenishing from Wave Knight, on completion of which she managed to pass her tow, the first line being passed by helicopter at 1500. Melika had a 20 degree list to port, she was fully laden with crude oil, and the damage to her port side where she had been rammed was extensive. Once the tow was passed, Puma was ordered to attach herself to the tanker's stern to try and control it. Bulwark now had to turn 60 degrees to starboard to set course for Karachi and St Brides Bay was told to take a wire from Bulwark's port bow and assist with the turn if necessary.

At 1715, Melika reported that her damaged well deck was working and that there was a danger of her breaking in two. Bulwark therefore decided to reverse course and make for the Gulf of Oman and there off load some of the tanker's cargo. This entailed a turn of 160 degrees and although Bulwark managed to turn, gallant efforts on the part of Puma could not pull the tankers stern round. St Brides Bay was ordered to take a line from Melika's port bow and try to help pull her round. The first attempt failed hut the second was successful. As before, Bulwark soon managed and although Puma's tow parted shortly afterwards, it was soon re-passed and the tow continued steadily throughout the night.

By dawn on Tuesday 16th the tow was only 80 miles from Ras Al Hadd, with Bulwark making three knots through the water and Puma lying astern holding the tanker steady. During the early forenoon Bulwark transferred two electrical ratings by helicopter to St Brides Bay and 1100 we were detached to take them to Fernand Gilabert.

Loch Killisport had made good progress during the last 24 hours and we joined her at 2000 with about 200 miles to go to Karachi. It was decided not to pass the personnel to the tanker until morning as the wind was freshening.

By morning on Wednesday 17th, the wind had dropped and St Brides Bay's seaboat was dropped in the lee of Fernand Gilabert and transferred the electrical officer and Bulwark's electrical ratings plus one of our able seamen who had been specially asked for as cook on board the tanker.

It was now apparent that St Brides Bay would no longer be required for this operation so having asked Loch Killisport to arrange air passage for our ratings on Fernand Gilabert back to Singapore, we transferred some personal gear for them to the tanker. This was done with a 'Heath Robinson' jackstay rig comprising odd pieces of cordage from both ships. In exchange we received enough frozen chicken, duck and hare to feed the ship's company for one meal, otherwise it would have gone bad.

At 1250, St Brides Bay was ordered to proceed to Trincomalee. The tow was 120 miles from Karachi, and expected to arrive on Saturday 20th. We left onboard the tanker 2 officers and 12 ratings. It is interesting to note that during these five days over 1,000 orders were passed.

So ended the most eventful five days of the commission so far, during which time all officers and ratings gained a tremendous amount of knowledge and experience of towing and salvage operations.